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The \ash crash" of May 6, 2010 provides a striking illustration of how a drop in the liquidity
of one security can quickly propagate to other securities. As shown in the CFTC-SEC report
on the ash crash, buy limit orders for the E-mini futures contract on the S&P 500 index
vanished in a few minutes after 2:30 p.m. on May 6, 2010.1 This evaporation of liquidity in
the E-mini futures was soon followed by a similar phenomenon in the SPY Exchange Traded
Fund (another derivative security on the S&P 500 index) and in the S&P 500 index component
stocks (see Figure 1.12 in the joint CFTC-SEC report), resulting in a very high volatility in
transaction prices (with some stocks trading as low as a penny or as high as $100;000).
Why do such liquidity spillovers arise? Addressing this question is of broad interest. It
can shed light on sudden and short systematic liquidity crises such as the ash crash. More
generally, it can explain why liquidity co-varies across securities.2 Co-movements in liquidity
have important implications for asset pricing since they are a source of systematic risk (see for
instance Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) and Amihud et al. (2005)
for a survey). Yet, their cause(s) is not well understood. Co-variations in liquidity may be
driven by systematic variations in the demand for liquidity (see Hendershott and Seasholes
(2009) or Koch, Ruenzi and Starks (2010)) or systematic variations in the supply of liquidity.
One possibility is that nancing constraints constitute a systematic liquidity factor because
they bind liquidity providers in dierent securities at the same time. This mechanism is for-
malized by Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnemeier and Pedersen (2007) and has received
empirical support from analysis of NYSE stocks (see for instance, Coughenour and Saad (2004)
or Comerton-Forde et al. (2010)). Another related explanation is that a drop in the capital
available to nancial intermediaries active in multiple securities can trigger an increase in risk
aversion, impairing the supply of liquidity in these securities (as in Kyle and Xiong (2001)).
In this paper we analyze a new mechanism that generates co-movements in the supply of
liquidity in dierent securities, even when dealers active in these securities are distinct and
not simultaneously hit by a market wide shock. Dealers in a security often rely on the prices
of other securities to set their quotes. For instance, dealers in a stock learn information from
the prices of other stocks in their industry or stock index futures. We show that cross-security
learning by dealers causes liquidity spillovers and thereby co-movements in liquidity.
To see this intuitively, consider a dealer in security X who uses the price of security Y as a
source of information. Movements in the price of security Y are informative because they reect
news about fundamentals known to dealers in security Y . However, this signal is noisy since
price movements in security Y also reect transient price pressures due to uninformed trades.
These transient price pressures account for a larger fraction of price volatility when the cost of
1See \Findings regarding the market events of May 6, 2010," CFTC-SEC joint report available at http:
//www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf
2Evidence of co-variations in liquidity are provided in Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001),
Huberman and Halka (2001), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), Corwin and Lipson (2011) for stocks and Chordia
et al. (2005) for bonds and stocks.
1liquidity provision for dealers in security Y is higher.3 For this reason, the informativeness of
the price of security Y for dealers in security X is smaller when security Y is less liquid.4 Now
suppose that a shock specic to security Y decreases the cost of liquidity provision for dealers
in this security (e.g., dealers in this security face less stringent limits on their positions). Thus,
security Y becomes more liquid and, for this reason, the price of security Y becomes more
informative for dealers in security X (transient price pressures in security Y contribute less to
its volatility relative to news about fundamentals). As a result, inventory risk for dealers in
security X is lower and the cost of liquidity provision for these dealers declines as well. In this
way, the improvement in liquidity for security Y spreads to security X, as shown in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
To formalize this intuition, we consider a model with distinct pools of risk averse dealers
operating in two securities, X and Y , with a two-factor structure. Dealers in a given market
have identical information on one of the risk factors. However, dealers operating in dierent
markets are informed on dierent risk factors. For this reason, dealers in one market can learn
information about the risk factor on which they have no information by watching the price of
the other security. We explore two cases: the case in which learning is two-sided (dealers in
each security learn from each other's price) and the case in which learning is one-sided (the
price of one security is informative for dealers in another security but not vice versa).5 We
refer to dealers who engage in cross-security price monitoring as being \pricewatchers." The
fraction of pricewatchers associated with a security sets the dealers' level of attention to the
other security.
The model generates the spillover mechanism portrayed in Figure 1 and a rich set of impli-
cations. First, when learning is two-sided, an exogenous shock to the cost of liquidity provision
in one security (say Y ) is amplied by the propagation of this shock to the cost of liquidity
provision in the other security (say X). Indeed, as learning is two-sided, the change in the
liquidity of security X feeds back on the liquidity of security Y , which sparks a chain reaction
amplifying the initial shock. Hence, liquidity is fragile in our model: a small exogenous drop
in the liquidity of one market can ultimately result in a disproportionately large drop in the
liquidity of this market and other related markets.
3For stocks listed on the NYSE, Hendershott, Li, Menkveld and Seasholes (2010) show that 25% of the
monthly return variance is due to transitory price changes. Interestingly, they also nd that transient price
pressures are stronger when market-makers' inventories are relatively large. This nding implies that price
movements are less informative when dealers' cost of liquidity provision is higher, in line with our model.
4In this paper, we measure liquidity by the sensitivity of prices to market order imbalances, as in Kyle
(1985). The market is more liquid when this sensitivity is low. Empirically, this sensitivity can be measured
by regressing price changes on order imbalances (see for instance Glosten and Harris (1988) or Korajczyk and
Sadka (2008)).
5For instance, consider dealers in a stock and dealers in stock index futures. The stock return is determined
both by a systematic factor and an idiosyncratic factor whereas the stock index futures return is only driven
by the systematic factor. Suppose that dealers in the stock index futures are well informed on the systematic
factor. In this case, dealers in the stock can learn information about the systematic factor from the price of the
stock index futures whereas dealers in the stock index futures have nothing to learn from the price of individual
stocks. In this case learning is one sided.
2Second, when learning is two-sided, the model can feature multiple equilibria with diering
levels of liquidity. The reason is as follows. Suppose that dealers in security X expect a drop
in the liquidity of security Y . Then, dealers in security X expect the price of security Y to be
noisier, which makes the market for security X less liquid. But as a consequence, the price of
security X becomes less informative for dealers in security Y and the liquidity of security Y
drops, which validates the expectation of dealers in security X. Hence, dealers' expectations
about the liquidity of the other security can be self-fullling. For this reason, there exist cases
in which, for the same parameter values, the liquidity of securities X and Y can be either
relatively high or relatively low.6 A sudden switch from a high to a low liquidity equilibrium is
an extreme form of co-variation in liquidity and fragility since it corresponds to a situation in
which the liquidity of several related securities dries up without an apparent reason.
Third, an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in a security has an ambiguous impact on
the liquidity of this security. On the one hand, this increase improves liquidity because price-
watchers require a smaller compensation for inventory risk (as they have more information).
On the other hand, entry of new pricewatchers impairs liquidity because it exposes inattentive
dealers (i.e., dealers without price information) to adverse selection. Indeed, pricewatchers bid
relatively conservatively for the security when they receive bad signals and relatively aggres-
sively when they receive good signals. As a result, inattentive dealers are more likely to end up
with relatively large (small) holdings when the value of the security is low (large). In reaction
to this winner's curse, inattentive dealers shade their bids, which reduces market liquidity. The
net eect on liquidity is always positive when dealers' risk bearing capacity (i.e., dealers' risk
tolerance divided by the variance of dealers' aggregate dollar inventory) is low enough. Other-
wise, an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers can impair market liquidity when the fraction
of pricewatchers is small.
Fourth, the exposure of inattentive dealers to adverse selection implies that liquidity spillovers
can be negative. To see why, suppose that the liquidity of security Y improves. This improve-
ment implies that the price of security Y conveys more precise information to pricewatchers
in security X. Thus, the informational disadvantage of inattentive dealers increases and, as a
result, the liquidity of security X may drop. For this to happen, we show that the fraction of
pricewatchers must be small enough and dealers' risk bearing capacity must be large.
In a last step, we endogenize the fraction of pricewatchers by introducing a cost of attention
to prices. There are several possible interpretations for this cost. It may simply reect the
fact that monitoring the price of other securities requires attention (it is time consuming) and
human dealers have limited attention.7 More importantly maybe, real-time data on prices are
costly to acquire. Data vendors (Reuters, Bloomberg, etc...) or trading platforms charge a fee
for real time datafeed.8 In particular, some market-makers can choose to pay a \co-location"
6There also exist cases in which the equilibrium is unique, even if learning is two-sided.
7Recent empirical papers (Corwin and Coughenour (2008), Boulatov et al. (2010) and Chakrabarty and
Moulton (2009)) nd that attention constraints for NYSE specialists have an eect on market liquidity. Thus,
modelling dealer attention is important to understand liquidity.
8Market participants often complain about these data fees.For instance, the fee charged by Nasdaq for the
dissemination of corporate bond prices has been very controversial. For accounts of these debates, see, for in-
3fee to trading platforms in order to obtain the right to place their computers close to platforms'
matching engines. In this way, they possess a split second advantage in accessing and reacting
to changes in prices. Last, in the absence of real time price reporting (as for instance in some
OTC markets), real time price information is available only to a few privileged dealers and very
costly to collect for other participants.9
When learning is one-sided, the value of price information declines with the fraction of
pricewatchers. Thus, the equilibrium fraction of pricewatchers is unique and inversely related
to the cost of price information. When dealers' risk bearing capacity is low, a decrease in
the cost of price information leads to an improvement in liquidity. Otherwise, liquidity is a U-
shaped function of this cost. Indeed, for relatively high values of the cost of price information, a
decrease in this cost triggers entry of a few pricewatchers, which is a source of adverse selection
risk and impairs liquidity, as explained previously.
In contrast, when learning is two-sided, the value of monitoring the price of, say, security
X for dealers in security Y can increase with the fraction of pricewatchers in either security
(for some parameter values). The reason is as follows. As explained previously, if dealers' risk
bearing capacity is low enough, an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in security Y makes
this security more liquid. This improvement in liquidity spreads to security X, which makes the
price of this security more informative. Thus, information on the price of security X becomes
more valuable for dealers in security Y . Furthermore, the value of information on the price of
security X for dealers in security Y also increases in the fraction of pricewatchers in security
X. Indeed, as the number of pricewatchers in security X increases, the price of this security
becomes more informative, which strengthens its informational value for dealers in security Y .
This nding is surprising since usually the value of nancial information declines with the
number of investors buying information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Admati and Peiderer
(1986)). This principle does not necessarily apply to price information because the precision of
price information increases in the number of dealers buying this information.
One consequence is that dealers' decisions to acquire price information on other securities
are self-reinforcing both within and across markets. As a result, there can be multiple levels
of attention in equilibrium for a xed value of the cost of attention to prices. In particular,
for identical parameter values, the markets for the two securities can appear well integrated
(the fraction of pricewatchers is high) or segmented (the fraction of pricewatchers is low).
As an illustration we construct an example in which, for a xed correlation in the payos of
both securities, the markets for securities X and Y are either fully integrated (all dealers are
pricewatchers) or segmented (no dealer is a pricewatcher). For dealers in security X, monitoring
the price of the other security does not have much value if there are no pricewatchers in security
Y and vice versa. Thus, the situation in which the two markets are segmented is self-sustaining
stance, \Latest Market Data Dispute Over NYSE's Plan to Charge for Depth-of-Book Data Pits NSX Against
Other U.S. Exchanges," Wall Street Technology, May 21, 2007; the letter to the SEC of the Securities Indus-
try and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_
letters/41907041.pdf, and \TRACE Market Data Fees go to SEC," Securities Industry News, 6/3/2002.
9For instance, a bond dealer may be an employee of a trading rm also active in credit default swaps (CDS).
In this way, the dealer may be privy of information on trades in CDSs written on the bond.
4and can persist even if the cost of attention declines.
The mechanism that leads to liquidity spillovers in our model generates predictions distinct
from the mechanisms based on funding constraints or systematic shifts in risk aversion described
in Brunnemeier and Pedersen (2008), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) or Kyle and Xiong (2001). In
our model, funding restrictions or an increase in risk aversion for dealers in one asset class (e.g.,
stocks) can initially spark a drop in the liquidity of this class of assets. However, in contrast
to other theories of co-variations in liquidity supply, our model predicts that this shock can
spread to other asset classes (e.g., bonds) even if there is no tightening of funding constraints for
dealers in other asset classes. The only requirement is that the prices of assets in the rst class
are used as a source of information to value assets in other classes. Furthermore, as explained
previously, in our model liquidity spillovers can be negative while theories based on funding
constraints imply positive liquidity spillovers.
Isolating the role of cross-asset learning in liquidity spillovers is challenging empirically
because this mechanism can operate simultaneously with other sources of systematic variations
in liquidity. One way to address this diculty consists in studying the eects of changes in
trading technologies that aect dealers' ability to learn from the prices of other assets. One
strategy is to consider cases in which a security switches from an opaque trading system (e.g.,
an OTC market) to a more transparent trading system (a case in point is the implementation
of post trade transparency in the U.S. bond market in 2002). In this case, dealers in related
securities can more easily use the information conveyed by the price of the previously opaque
security. This is similar to a decrease in the cost of price information in our model. Another
approach is to study the eect of changes in co-location fees. Indeed, dealers who co-locate can
be seen as pricewatchers in our model (they have very quick access to prices of other securities
and can thereby make their strategies contingent on these prices). Hence, variations in co-
location fees should also aect the fraction of pricewatchers. We develop predictions about the
eects of such changes in trading technologies in the last part of the paper.
Our model is related to models of contagion (King and Wadhwani (1990), Kodres and
Pritsker (2002), or Pasquariello (2007)) and cross-asset price pressures (Andrade, Chang and
Seasholes (2008), Bernhardt and Taub (2008), Pasquariello and Vega (2009), Boulatov, Hen-
dershott and Livdan (2010). These models describe various mechanisms through which a shock
on investors' information or liquidity traders' demand in one security can aect the prices of
other securities.10 None of these models however studies the role of cross-asset learning in the
transmission of a liquidity shock (i.e., a change in the sensitivity of price to order imbalances)
in one security to other securities, as we do here. Our paper is also linked to the literature on
the value of nancial information (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Admati and Peiderer
(1986)). We contribute to this literature by studying the value of securities price information.
As explained previously, we show that price information is special in the sense that its value
can increase with the number of investors buying this information, an eect which does not
arise in standard models of information acquisition. In this respect, our paper adds to the few
10Most of these models build upon the multi-asset pricing models of Admati (1985) and Caballe and Krishnan
(1994).
5papers identifying conditions under which the value of nancial information may increase with
the number of informed investors (Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), Veldkamp (2006), Chamley
(2007), and Ganguli and Yang (2009)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3,
we consider the case in which the fraction of pricewatchers is xed and we show how liquidity
spillovers and multiple equilibria arise in this set-up. In Section 4, we study how the value
of price information depends on the fraction of pricewatchers and we endogenize this fraction.
Section 5 discusses testable implications of the model and Section 6 concludes. Proofs are
collected in the Appendix or the Internet Appendix.
2 The model
We consider two securities, denoted D and F. These securities pay-o at date 2 and their
payos, vD and vF, are given by a factor model with two risk factors D and F, i.e.,
vD = D + dD  F + ; (1)
vF = dF  D + F + : (2)
The random variables D, F,  and  are independent and have a normal distribution, with
mean zero. The variance of  is denoted 2
. We make additional parametric assumptions that
simplify the exposition without aecting our conclusions. First, there is no idiosyncratic risk
for security F (i.e.,  = 0). Second, the variance of the factors is normalized to one. Third,
we assume that dF = 1 and dD 2 [0;1], so that the payos of the two securities are positively
correlated. To simplify notations, we therefore denote dD by d. When d = 0, the payo of
security D does not depend on factor F. Thus, the price of security F cannot convey new
information to dealers in security D. In this case, we say that learning is one-sided.
Trades in securities D and F take place at date 1. In each market, there are two types of
traders: (i) a continuum of risk-averse speculators and (ii) liquidity traders. The aggregate
demand of liquidity traders in market j is uj  N(0;2
uj). Liquidity traders' demands in both
markets are independent and are absorbed by speculators. Hence, in the rest of the paper, we
refer to speculators as dealers and to uj as the size of the demand shock in market j.
Dealers are specialized: they are active in only one security. In this way, we rule out
co-movements in liquidity which arise simply because the same dealers are active in multiple
securities.11 Dealers specialized in security j have perfect information on factor j and no
information on factor  j. However, they can follow the price of the other security to obtain
information on this factor. We denote by j the fraction of dealers specialized in security j who
monitor the price of security  j and we refer to j, as the level of attention to security  j.
11In reality, dealer rms are active in multiple securities. However, these rms delegate trade-related decisions
to individuals who operate on specialized trading desks. Naik and Yadav (2003) show empirically that the
decision-making of these trading desks is largely decentralized (e.g., dealers' trading decisions within a rm are
mainly driven by their own inventory exposure rather than the aggregate inventory exposure of the dealer rm
to which they belong). Their results suggest that there is no direct centralized information sharing between
dealers within these rms.
6We refer to these dealers as being pricewatchers. Other dealers are called inattentive dealers.
We use W to index the decisions made by pricewatchers and I to index the decisions made by
inattentive dealers. The polar cases, in which there are either no pricewatchers in either market
(D = F = 0) or all dealers are pricewatchers (D = F = 1) are called the \no attention
case" and the \full attention case," respectively. Table 1 summarizes the various possible cases
that will be considered in the paper.
Attention/Learning One-Sided: d = 0 Two-Sided: d > 0
No Attention D = F = 0 D = F = 0
Limited Attention j > 0 and  j < 1 j > 0 and  j < 1
Full Attention D = F = 1 D = F = 1
Table 1: Various Cases
Each dealer in market j has a CARA utility function with risk tolerance j. Thus, if dealer




















where ij = (vj   pj)xij and Pk
j is the price information available to a dealer with type
k 2 fW;Ig operating in security j.
As dealers submit price contingent demand functions, they all act as if they were observing
the clearing price in their market. Thus, we have PW
j = fpj;p jg and PI
j = fpjg. We denote
the demand function of a pricewatcher by xW
j (j;pj;p j) and that of an inattentive dealer by
xI
j(j;pj).12 In each period, the clearing price in security j, pj, is such that the demand for this
security is equal to its supply, i.e.,
jx
W
j (j;pj;p j)di + (1   j)x
I
j(j;pj)di + uj = 0, for j 2 fD;Fg: (4)
As in many other papers (e.g., Kyle (1985) or Vives (1995)), we will measure the level of
illiquity in security j by the sensitivity of the clearing price to the demand shock (i.e., @pj=@uj).
In equilibrium, the aggregate inventory position of dealers in security j after trading at date 1
is  uj and the total dollar value of this position at date 1 is  uj vj. The risk associated with
this position for dealers in security j can be measured by its variance conditional on information
on risk factor j, i.e., 2
ujVar[vjjj]. Thus, the ratio of dealers' risk tolerance to this variance
(the total amount of risk taken by the dealers) is a measure of the risk bearing capacity of the
12As pricewatchers observe the price in security  j, they can make their trading strategy in security j
contingent on this price. Alternatively, one can assume that pricewatchers do not observe directly the price of
security  j but are allowed to place limit orders (a demand function) in security j contingent on the price of
other securities. Such indexed limit orders have been proposed by Black (1995) but are typically not oered by
exchanges. See Cespa (2004) for an analysis of trading mechanisms that allow multi-price contingent orders.







The higher is Rj, the higher is the risk bearing capacity of the dealers in security j. As we
shall see this ratio plays an important role for some of our ndings.
There are several ways to interpret the two securities in our model. For instance, as in
King and Wadhwani (1990), securities D and F could be two stock market indexes for two
dierent countries. Alternatively, they could represent a derivative and its underlying security.
For instance, security D could be a credit default swap (CDS) and security F the stock of
the rm on which the CDS is written. When d = f = 1 and 2
 = 0, the payo of the two
securities is identical, as in Chowdry and Nanda (1991). In this case, the two securities can
be viewed as the stock of a cross-listed rm and its American Depository Receipt (ADR) in
the U.S. for instance. Factor F can then be viewed as the component of the rm's cash-ows
that comes from its sales in the U.S. In each of these cases, it is natural to assume that dealers
have specialized information. For instance, dealers in country j will be well informed on local
fundamental news but not on foreign fundamental news as in King and Wadhwani (1990).13
3 Attention and liquidity spillovers
3.1 Benchmark: No attention
We rst analyze the equilibrium in the no attention case (D = F = 0). For instance, the
markets for securities D and F may be opaque so that dealers in each security can obtain
information on the price of the other security only after some delay. Alternatively, the prices
of each security are available in real time but accessing this information is so costly that no
dealer chooses to be informed on the price of the other security (see Section 4).
Lemma 1. (Benchmark) When F = D = 0, the equilibrium price in market j is:
pj = j + Bj0uj; (6)
with BD0 = 
 1
D (2
 + d2) and BF0 = 
 1
F .
The sensitivity of the equilibrium price for security j to the aggregate demand shock in this
market, the illiquidity of security j, is given by Bj0 (we use index \0" to refer to the case in
which F = D = 0). In the no attention case, the illiquidity of security D is determined by
parameters 2
, d, and D. We refer to these parameters as being the \liquidity fundamentals"
of security D. Similarly, we refer to F as a liquidity fundamental of security F since it only
aects the illiquidity of security F. Illiquidity increases with dealers' risk aversion (j decreases)
and uncertainty on the securities' payos (2
 increases).
13In the case of the CDS market, dealers in CDS are often aliated with lenders and therefore better informed
on the likelihood of defaults (and size of associated losses) than dealers in the stock market (see Acharya and
Johnson (2007))
8Importantly, in the benchmark case, there are no liquidity spillovers: a change in the illiquid-
ity fundamental of one market does not aect the illiquidity of the other market. For instance,
an increase in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D makes this security more liquid but it
has no eect on the illiquidity of the other security.14 In contrast, with limited or full attention,
a change in the illiquidity fundamental of one security will aect the illiquidity of the other
security, as shown in the next sections.
3.2 Liquidity spillovers with full attention
In this section, we consider the case in which all dealers are pricewatchers, that is the full
attention case (D = F = 1). The analysis is more complex than in the benchmark case
as dealers in one security extract information about the factor that is unknown to them from
the price of the other security. To solve this signal extraction problem, dealers must form
beliefs on the relationship between clearing prices and risk factors. We will focus on equilibria
in which these beliefs are correct, i.e., the rational expectations equilibria of the model. We
rst show that, in contrast to the benchmark case, the levels of illiquidity of both markets
are interdependent and this interdependence leads to multiple equilibria (Section 3.2.1). We
then provide an explanation for this nding and we show that that the interdependence in
the illiquidity of securities D and F leads to liquidity spillovers: a shock to the illiquidity
fundamental of one security propagates to the other security (Section 3.2.2). Finally, we show
that when learning is two-sided, the total eect of a small shock on the illiquidity fundamental
of one security can be much larger than the initial eect of such a shock (Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Equilibria with full attention




j1 = Rj1j + Bj1uj + Aj1 j + Cj1u j; (7)
and p
j1 clears the market of asset j for each realization of fuj; j; u j; jg when dealers
anticipate that clearing prices satisfy equation (7) and choose their trading strategy to maximize
their expected utility (given in equation (3)). We say that the equilibrium is non-fully revealing
if pricewatchers in security j cannot infer perfectly the realization of risk factor  j from
observing the price of security  j. The sensitivity of the price in market j to the demand
shock in this market, i.e., the \illiquidity of market j," is measured by Bj1 in the full attention
case. Index \1" is used to refer to the equilibrium when D = F = 1.
Proposition 1. With full attention and 2
 > 0, there always exists a non-fully revealing linear
rational expectations equilibrium. At any non-fully revealing equilibrium, Bj1 > 0, Rj1 = 1 and
14In our model, a variation in risk tolerance of dealers in one security is just one way to vary the cost of
liquidity provision for dealers in one asset class. In reality variations in this cost may be due to variations in
risk tolerance, inventory limits or nancing constraints for dealers in this asset class. The important point is
that they do not directly aect dealers in other asset classes.



























Proposition 1 shows that the illiquidities of securities D and F are interdependent since BD1
is a function of BF1 and vice versa. Moreover, all coecients in the equilibrium price function
can be expressed as functions of the illiquidity of securities D and F. Thus, the number of non-
fully revealing linear rational expectations equilibria is equal to the number of pairs fB
D1,B
F1g
solving the system of equations (8) and (9). In general, we cannot characterize these solutions
analytically and therefore cannot solve for the equilibria in closed-form. However, we can nd
these solutions numerically. In Figure 2 we illustrate the determination of the equilibrium levels
of illiquidity by plotting the functions f1() and g1() for specic values of the parameters.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The equilibria are the values of BD1 and BF1 at which the curves representing the functions
f1() and g1() intersect. In panel (a) we set j = d = 1, uj = 2, and  = 0:2. In this case, we
obtain three equilibria: one with a low level of illiquidity, one with a medium level of illiquidity
and one with a relatively high level of illiquidity. In panels (b) and (c), we pick values of  or d
such that the correlation between the payos of securities D and F is smaller ( = 1 in panel
(b) while d = 0:9 in panel (c)). In this case, we obtain a unique equilibrium. More generally,
when d is low relative to 2
, the model has a unique rational expectations equilibrium, as shown
in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. If 4d2 < 2
 and D = F = 1 then there is a unique non-fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium.
In particular, when learning is one sided (d = 0), there exists a unique non-fully revealing
linear rational expectations equilibrium. Furthermore, in this case, we can characterize the
equilibrium in closed-form (see Corollary 6 below).15
The case in which 2
 = 0 requires a separate analysis. In this case, it is still true that if
there exists a non-fully revealing equilibrium then BD1 and BF1 solve the system of equations
(8) and (9). However, in this case, the unique solution to this system of equations can be
BD1 = BF1 = 0 so that a non-fully revealing equilibrium does not exist. As an example,
consider the case in which the two securities are identical: d = 1, 2
 = 0, F = D = ,
2
uj = 2
u. We refer to this case as the symmetric case.
15The condition given in Corollary 1 is sucient to guarantee the existence of a unique rational expectations
equilibrium when all dealers are pricewatchers, but it is not necessary. Numerical simulations show that there
exist multiple equilibria when d is high relative to 2
. Moreover it can be shown formally that the model has
either one or three non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibria.
10Lemma 2. In the symmetric case with full attention, if 2
u > 42, there are two non fully
revealing linear rational expectations equilibria: a \High" illiquidity equilibrium and a \Low"













with BH > BL. If 2
u < 42, a non-fully revealing equilibrium does not exist.
3.2.2 Cross-asset learning and liquidity spillovers
We now explain why cross-asset learning is naturally conducive to multiple equilibria and
liquidity spillovers. To this end, it is useful to analyze in detail how dealers in one security
extract information from the price of the other security. Our starting point is the following
lemma.




j = (1   Aj1A j1)!j + Aj1p

 j; for j 2 fF;Dg: (12)




 jg, available to pricewatchers operating in security j.
In other words, ! j is the signal about the risk factor  j that pricewatchers operating in
security j extract from the price of security  j. In the absence of information on the price of
security  j, the precision of the forecast formed by dealers in security j about the payo of




















Hence, the higher 2
j1 is, the greater the informativeness of the signal conveyed by the price of
security  j to dealers in security j. For this reason, we refer to 2
j1 as the informativeness of
the price of security  j about the payo of security j for dealers operating in security j. Using


















16This result follows from the fact that if X and Y are two random variables with normal distribution then
Var[XjY ] = Var[X]   Cov
2[X;Y ]=Var[Y ] and the fact that E[! j jj ] = 0.
11When d = 0, the price of security F does not convey information to dealers in security D
(2
D1 = 0) since the payo of security D does not depend on the risk factor known to dealers in
security F. Using the expressions for Bj1 given in Proposition 1, we obtain that
Bj1 = Bj0(1   
2
j1): (17)
This observation yields the following result.
Corollary 2. The markets for securities D and F are less illiquid with full attention than with
no attention, i.e., Bj1  Bj0. Moreover, with full attention, an increase in the informativeness





The intuition for this result is straightforward. By watching the price of another security,
dealers learn information. Hence, they face less uncertainty about the payo of the security in
which they are active. For this reason, with full attention, dealers require a smaller premium
than with no attention to absorb a given demand shock (rst part of the corollary) and this
premium decreases with the informativeness of prices (last part of the corollary).
Price movements in security j are driven both by news about factor j and demand shocks
specic to this security. The contribution of demand shocks to price variations becomes rela-
tively higher when security j becomes more illiquid. As a consequence the price of security j
becomes less informative for dealers in other markets when security j becomes more illiquid.
To see this, remember that the signal about factor j conveyed by the price of security j to
dealers in security  j is !j = j + Bj1uj. Clearly, this signal is noisier when Bj1 is higher,
which yields the following result.
Corollary 3. With full attention, an increase in the illiquidity of security j makes its price





Corollaries 2 and 3 explain why the illiquidity of security D and F are interdependent when
dealers in the two securities learn from each other's prices. Indeed, the illiquidity of security  j
determines the informativeness of the price of this security for dealers in security j (Corollary
3) and as a result the illiquidity of security j (Corollary 2).
This observation helps us to understand how multiple equilibria can arise when dealers
learn from each other's prices. Consider dealers in security F. They do not directly observe the
sensitivity of the price to demand shocks in security D, i.e., the illiquidity of security D. Hence,
ultimately, the informativeness of the price of security D for dealers in security F depends on
their belief regarding the illiquidity of security D. Similarly, the informativeness of the price of
security F for dealers in security D depends on their belief regarding the illiquidity of security
F. In sum, the illiquidity of security j depends on the beliefs of the dealers active in this
12security about the illiquidity of security  j, which itself depends on the beliefs of its dealers
about the illiquidity of security j. This loop leads to multiplicity as, for the same values of the
exogenous parameters, various systems of beliefs can be self-sustaining.17
This circularity breaks down when dealers in security D do not use the information contained
in the price of security F (either because D = 0 or because d = 0). In this case, the illiquidity
of security D is uniquely pinned down by its \fundamentals" (D and 2
) and, as a result,
the beliefs of dealers in security F regarding the liquidity of security D are uniquely dened
as well (since dealers' expectations about the illiquidity of the other security must be correct
in equilibrium). More generally, when d is low relative to 2
, security D is not much exposed
to factor F. Thus, the beliefs of dealers in security D about the liquidity of security F play
a relatively minor role in the determination of the liquidity of security D and, for this reason,
the equilibrium is unique, as shown in Corollary 1.
The interdependence in the illiquidity of securities D and F has another implication. In
contrast to the benchmark case, an exogenous change in the illiquidity of one market (due for
instance to an increase in dealers' risk tolerance in this market) aects the illiquidity of the
other market. We call this eect a liquidity spillover. To see this point, consider the eect of
an increase in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D. The immediate eect of this increase
is to make security D more liquid as in the benchmark case. Hence, its price becomes more
informative for dealers in security F (Corollary 3), which then becomes more liquid (Corollary
2) because inventory risk for dealers in security F is smaller when they are all better informed.
Thus, the improvement in the liquidity of security D spreads to liquidity F, although security
F experiences no change in its liquidity fundamentals.
More formally, consider the system of equations (8) and (9). Other things equal, an increase
in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D makes this security more liquid since @f1=@D <
0. In turn this improvement spreads to security F because @g1=@BD1 6= 0. More generally,
any exogenous change in the illiquidity of security D will spill over to security F because
@g1=@BD1 6= 0. Similarly, an exogenous change in the illiquidity of security F will spill over to
security D when @f1=@BF1 6= 0. The direction (positive/negative) of these liquidity spillovers
is determined by the signs of @g1=@BD1 and @f1=@BF1.
Corollary 4. With full attention, liquidity spillovers are always positive, i.e., @f1=@BF1  0
and @g1=@BD1 > 0. Moreover when learning is one sided (d = 0), there is no spillover from
security F to security D because the price of security F conveys no information to dealers in
security D. In contrast, when learning is two-sided (d > 0), liquidity spillovers operate in both
directions.
Intuitively, positive liquidity spillovers generate positive co-movements in illiquidity across-
securities. In our model, illiquidity is not stochastic (it is a deterministic function of the
parameters). However, we can create variations in illiquidity by picking randomly the exogenous
17Ganguli and Yang (2009) consider a single security model of price formation similar to Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980). They show that multiple non-fully revealing linear rational expectations equilibria arise when
investors have private information both on the asset payo and the aggregate supply of the security. The source
of multiplicity here is dierent since dealers have no supply information in our model.
13parameters of the model (e.g., the risk tolerance of dealers in security D) and compute the
resulting covariance for illiquidity of securities F and D. Figure 5 in Section 3.3 provides an
example that shows how positive liquidity spillovers result in positive covariation in liquidity.
3.2.3 Amplication: the illiquidity multiplier
With two-sided learning, liquidity spillovers operate in both directions. As a consequence, the
total eect of a small change in the illiquidity fundamentals of one security is higher than the
direct eect of these changes.
To see this consider the chain of eects that follows a small reduction, denoted by D < 0,
in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D. The direct eect of this reduction is to increase
the illiquidity of security D by (@f1=@D)D > 0. As a consequence, the price of this security
becomes less informative. Hence, dealers in security F face more uncertainty and security
F becomes less liquid as well, although its liquidity fundamental (F) is unchanged. The
immediate increase in the illiquidity of security F is equal to (@g1=@BD1)(@f1=@D)D > 0.
When learning is two sided (d > 0), this increase in illiquidity for security F leads to an even
larger increase in the illiquidity of security D, starting a new vicious loop (as the increase in
illiquidity for security D leads to a further increase in illiquidity for security F etc,...). As a
result, the total eect of the initial decrease in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D is an
order of magnitude larger than its direct eect on the illiquidity of both securities. The next






and assume that d > 0. With full attention, the total eects of a change in the risk tolerance
of dealers in security D is given by
dBD1
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< 0:
and there always exists at least one equilibrium in which  > 1.
Thus, the initial eects of a small change in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D are
amplied by a factor . We call  the \illiquidity multiplier." This illiquidity multiplier can
be relatively large when the illiquidity of each market is very sensitive to the illiquidity of the
other market ((@g1=@BD1)(@f1=@BF1) is high). In this sense, cross-asset learning is a source of
fragility for nancial markets.18
18Allen and Gale (2004) dene a nancial market as being fragile if \small shocks have disproportionately
large eects." (Allen and Gale (2004), page 1015).
14Figure 3 illustrates this point for specic values of the parameters (in all our numerical
examples we choose the parameter values such that there is a unique rational expectations
equilibrium, except otherwise stated). It shows the value of  for various values of the id-
iosyncratic risk of security D () and the resulting values for the direct and total eects of a
change in this risk tolerance on the illiquidity of securities D and F, as a function of . In
this example, the total drop in illiquidity of each security after a decrease in risk tolerance for
dealers in security D can be up to ten times bigger than the direct eect of this drop.
Table 2 provides another perspective on the illiquidity multiplier by showing the elasticity,
denoted EBj1;D, of illiquidity in each security to the risk tolerance of dealers in security D,
i.e., the percentage change in illiquidity in each security for a one percent increase in the risk
tolerance of dealers in security D. The table also shows the elasticity that would be obtained
(^ EBj1;D) in the absence of the illiquidity multiplier (e.g.,  = 1 if D = 0). For instance, when
D = 1:8, a drop of 1% in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D triggers an increase of 9%
in the illiquidity of security D and 14:9% in the illiquidity of security F. This is much larger
than what would be obtained in the absence of bi-directional spillovers (e.g., if D = 0) since in
this case the illiquidity of securities D and F would increase by only 1% and 1:5% respectively.
D  BD1 BF1
Elasticities
EBD1;D ^ EBD1;D EBF1;D ^ EBF1;D
2:2 1:54 0:19 2:11  1:54  1:00  2:80  1:81
2 2:16 0:23 2:87  2:16  1:00  3:80  1:76
1:8 9:94 0:36 5:94  9:49  1:00  14:95  1:50
1:62 2:35 0:57 11:01  2:35  1:00  2:54  1:08
1:46 1:65 0:70 13:41  1:65  1:00  1:45  0:88
1:31 1:39 0:82 15:29  1:39  1:00  1:00  0:72
Table 2: The table shows the impact of the illiquidity multiplier for dierent shocks to the
risk aversion of dealers in market D. Other parameter values are d = 1,  = :62, uF = :1,
uD = 1:6, D = 1:8, and F = 1=24.
The corollary focuses on the eect of an increase in the risk tolerance of dealers in security
D but the eects of a change in the other exogenous parameters of the model (F and 2
) are
also magnied for the same reasons.
Last, we note that when the equilibrium is unique, it is necessarily such that  > 1 (an
implication of the last part of Corollary 5). When there are multiple equilibria, there is in
general one equilibrium for which  < 0. This equilibrium delivers \unintuitive"comparative
statics.19 For instance, in this equilibrium, a reduction in the risk tolerance of dealers in, say,
security D increases the liquidity of both securities. Such an equilibrium may exist because,
19It is possible to show that the model has three equilibria when it admits multiple equilibria. The equilibrium
with  < 0 is unstable whereas the two other equilibria (for which  > 1) are stable.
15as explained previously, the illiquidity of each security is in part determined by dealers' beliefs
about the illiquidity of the other market. These beliefs may be disconnected from the illiquidity
fundamentals of each security and yet be self-fullling.
3.3 Limited attention, adverse selection, and negative liquidity spillovers
We now turn our attention to the more general case in which 0 < D  1 and 0 < F  1. That
is, we allow for limited attention by dealers in either security. In this case, the pricewatchers
(dealers who monitor the price of the other security) have an informational advantage over
inattentive dealers (dealers who do not monitor this price). This advantage is a source of adverse
selection for inattentive dealers. This eect yields two new results: (a) liquidity spillovers can
be negative and (b) an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in one security can reduce
the liquidity of this security when the fraction of pricewatchers is small. We now explain the
intuition for these two results in more details. We proceed as follows. We rst generalize
Proposition 1 when attention is limited (Section 3.3.1). We then show that liquidity spillovers
can be negative with limited attention and we provide a sucient condition on the parameters
for liquidity spillovers to be always positive (Section 3.3.2). Finally, we study the eect of a
change in the fraction of pricewatchers in a security on the liquidity of this security (Section
3.3.3).
3.3.1 Equilibria with limited attention





j = Rjj + Bjuj + Aj j + Cju j; (21)
and p
j clears the market of asset j for each realizations of fuj; j; u j; jg when dealers antic-
ipate that clearing prices satisfy equation (21) and choose their trading strategies to maximize
their expected utility. The next proposition generalizes Proposition 1 when 0 < D  1 and
0 < F  1.
Proposition 2. Suppose 2
 > 0. With limited attention (i.e., 0 < D  1 and 0 < F  1),
there always exists a non fully revealing linear rational expectations equilibrium. At any non-
fully revealing equilibrium, Bj > 0, Rj = 1 and the coecients Aj and Cj can be expressed as
functions of Bj and B j. Moreover


















 + d2)(1 + B2
F2
uF)) and 2
F  1=(1 + B2
D2
uD).
Proposition 2 generalizes Proposition 1 when attention is limited. As in the full attention
case, it can be shown that (i) pricewatchers in security j extract a signal ! j =  j + B ju j
from the price of security  j and that (ii) variable 2
j is the informativeness of this signal. As
16the pricewatchers' trading strategy depends on the information they obtain from watching the
price of security  j (i.e., ! j), the price of security j partially reveals pricewatchers' private
information.20 Equation (21) implies that observing the price of security j and risk factor j
is informationally equivalent to observing ^ !j  Aj j + Bjuj + Cju j. Thus, in equilibrium,
the information set of inattentive dealers, fj, pjg, is informationally equivalent to fj, ^ !jg. In
what follows, we refer to ^ !j as inattentive dealers' price signal. Using the expressions for Aj
and Cj (given in the proof of Proposition 2), we obtain that ^ !j = Aj! j + Bjuj. Hence, when
Bj > 0, inattentive dealers' price signal is less precise than pricewatchers' price signal, which
means that inattentive dealers in security j are at an informational disadvantage compared to
pricewatchers.
This disadvantage creates an adverse selection problem for the inattentive dealers. Indeed,
relative to inattentive dealers, pricewatchers will bid aggressively when the price of security  j
indicates that the realization of the risk factor  j is high and conservatively when the price
of security  j indicates that the realization of the risk factor  j is low. As a consequence,
inattentive dealers in one security will tend to have relatively large holdings of the security when
its value is low and relatively small holdings of the security when its value is large. This bias
in inattentive dealers' portfolio holdings is a source of adverse selection, which is absent when
all dealers are pricewatchers. This new eect is key to understanding why liquidity spillovers
may be negative in the limited attention case (see below).
Substituting 2
D and 2
F by their expressions in equation (22), we can express Bj as a function









where the expressions for the functions f() and g() are given in the Appendix (see equations
(A.26) and (A.28)). The linear rational expectations equilibria are completely characterized
by the solution(s) of this system of equations. As in the full attention case and for the same
reason, there might be multiple equilibria and we cannot in general provide an analytical
characterization of these equilibria. Of course, when D = F = 1, the solutions to the
previous system of equations are those obtained in the full attention case since this case is
nested in the limited attention case.
3.3.2 When are liquidity spillovers positive?
As mentioned previously, liquidity spillovers from one security to the other can be negative
when the fraction of pricewatchers in the latter security is relatively small. The intuition for
negative spillovers is more easily seen when learning is one sided (d = 0) or when no dealers
20Pricewatchers' trading strategy (demand function) can be written as
xW
j (pj;! j) = aW
j (E[vj j j;p j]   pj) = aW
j (j   pj) + bW
j ! j;
where expressions for coecients aW
j and bW
j are provided in the proof of Proposition 2.
17in security D are pricewatchers (D = 0). Indeed, in these cases, the price of security F
conveys no information to dealers in security D. Thus, the level of illiquidity in security D
is as in the benchmark case (BD = BD0) and the level of illiquidity in security F is readily
obtained by substituting this expression for BD in equation (22). Hence, there is a unique
rational expectations equilibrium and we can characterize the equilibrium in closed form, which
considerably simplies the analysis. Remember that RF is a measure of dealers' risk bearing
capacity in security F (see equation (5)). We obtain the following result.
Corollary 6. With one-sided learning (d = 0) or no pricewacthers in security D (D =
0), there is a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium where the levels of illiquidity of
securities D and F are




















In this equilibrium, liquidity spillovers from security D to security F are positive for all values
of F if RF  1. In contrast, if RF > 1, liquidity spillovers from security D to security F are
negative when F < ^ F and positive when F  ^ F, where ^ F is strictly smaller than one and
dened in the proof of the corollary.
When D = F = 1, the corollary describes the equilibrium obtained with full attention and
one sided learning. In this case, as explained previously, liquidity spillovers from security D to
security F are always positive. In contrast, when F is small enough and RF > 1, liquidity
spillovers from security D to security F can be negative.
To see why, consider a decrease in the risk tolerance of the dealers operating in security D
(D decreases). This decrease makes security D less liquid and therefore less informative for
pricewatchers in security F. Thus, uncertainty about the payo of security F increases. As
with full attention, this \uncertainty eect" increases the illiquidity of security F. However,
with limited attention, there is a countervailing eect that we call the \adverse selection eect."
Indeed, as pricewatchers' private information is less precise, their informational advantage is
smaller. As a consequence, inattentive dealers are less exposed to adverse selection. This eect
reduces the illiquidity of security F. Intuitively the reduction in uncertainty has a small eect
on illiquidity when (i) few dealers receive price information (F < ^ F) and (ii) when dealers'
risk bearing capacity is high (i.e., RF > 1) since in this case uncertainty is not a big driver
of illiquidity. When these conditions are met, the adverse selection eect prevails over the
uncertainty eect. As a result the increase in the illiquidity of security D reduces the illiquidity
of security F. Otherwise, the uncertainty eect dominates and liquidity spillovers from security
D to F are positive.
We now consider the more general case in which learning is two-sided (d > 0). The next
corollary shows that liquidity spillovers in this case are positive if the fraction of pricewatchers








; for j 2 fD;Fg: (27)
If D 2 [D;1] and F 2 [F;1] then liquidity spillovers from security D to security F and vice
versa are positive for all values of d.
Thus, the model will feature positive liquidity spillovers if the level of attention is higher
than j for j 2 fD;Fg. This threshold is always less than one and can be as low as zero if
dealers' risk bearing capacity is small enough in both markets, i.e., if Rj  1 for j 2 fD;Fg.
In contrast, when the fraction of pricewatchers in security j is less than j, liquidity spillovers
from security  j to security j can be negative for the reasons explained previously.
As an example, suppose that the parameter values are as follows: uF = 0:1, uD = 1,
F = 1, d = 1, D = F = 0:1, and  = 1. In this case, D = 0 while F = 0:9. Thus,
liquidity spillovers from security F to security D are positive while liquidity spillovers from
security D to security F can be negative since F < F (Corollary 7). For instance Figure 4
considers the eect of an increase in the risk tolerance of dealers in security D. This increase
reduces the illiquidity of security D but it increases the illiquidity of security F because liquidity
spillovers from security D to security F are negative in this case.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Our model predicts the existence of positive or negative liquidity spillovers between secu-
rities. Empirically, these spillovers should translate into positive or negative co-movement in
liquidity. We illustrate this point with the following experiment. For a given value of F, we
compute the illiquidity of securities F and D assuming that D is uniformly distributed in
[0:5;1] and setting uF = uD = 1=2,  = 2, F = 1=2. For these values of the parameters
j = 0 and liquidity spillovers are therefore positive. We then compute the covariance between
the resulting equilibrium values for BD and BF. Figure 5, Panel (a) and Panel (b) show this co-
variance as a function of F when d = 0 and d = 0:9, respectively (for D = 0:1 and D = 0:9).
In both cases, the covariance between the illiquidity of securities D and F is positive because
illiquidity spillovers are positive. In panel (c) we set uF = 0:1, d = 0:9 and D = 0:9 while
other parameters are unchanged. In this case liquidity spillovers from security D to security F
can be negative when F is smalle enough. As a result the covariance between the illiquidity of
security D and the illiquidity of security F is negative for relative low values of F and positive
otherwise.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
3.3.3 Is attention good for market liquidity?
We now study the relationship between the illiquidity of a security and the fraction of price-
watchers in this security. We already know that the illiquidity of security j is always smaller
with full attention than with no attention (see Corollary 2). However, as shown below, for small
19values of the fraction of pricewatchers, the illiquidity of a security may be strictly higher than
with no attention. Hence, the relationship between illiquidity and attention is non monotonic.
Again it is easier to establish this result when learning is one sided (d = 0) or when D = 0
since in these cases the equilibrium is unique and we can characterize it in closed-form. We
obtain the following result.
Corollary 8. Consider the cases in which learning is one sided (d = 0) or in which there are
no pricewacthers in security D (D = 0).
1. If RF  1, an increase in attention by dealers in security F reduces the illiquidity of this
security.
2. If RF > 1, an increase in attention by dealers in security F reduces the illiquidity of this
security if F  
F
F and increases its illiquidity if F < 
F
F where 0 < 
F
F < 1 (see the
appendix for the analytical expression of 
F
F ).
The impact of a change in the fraction of pricewatchers in security F on the liquidity of this
market is determined by both the adverse selection eect and the uncertainty eect, which play
in opposite directions. On the one hand, an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in security
F raises the exposure to adverse selection for inattentive dealers in security F. On the other
hand, more dealers have relatively low inventory holding costs because more dealers are better
informed about the payo of security j. The rst eect raises illiquidity while the second eect
decreases illiquidity. As shown in Corollary 8, the second eect always prevails when the risk
bearing capacity of dealers in security F is less than one. When this condition is not satised,
the adverse selection eect dominates when the fraction of pricewatchers is small (F < 
F
F ).
Hence, the relationship between the liquidity of security F and the fraction of pricewatchers is
non monotonic: it increases in the fraction of pricewatchers when this fraction is less than 
F
F ,
reaches a maximum when this fraction is equal to 
F
F and then decreases.
When learning is two-sided, i.e., d > 0, the analysis of the impact of a change in attention in
one market is more complex because liquidity spillovers operate in both directions. Hence, as
explained in Section 3.2.3, the total impact of a change in the fraction of pricewatchers in one
security on the illiquidity of this security is determined both by the direct impact of this change
on illiquidity (measured by (@f=@D) or (@g=@F)) and the indirect impact which accounts for
the spillover eects described in the previous section. This indirect impact can be positive or
negative depending on the direction of liquidity spillovers between the two markets. Signing
the total impact of an increase in attention in one market on the level of illiquidity in both
markets is therefore challenging. However, the next corollary shows that if Rj  1 then more
attention leads to a more liquid market for both securities in at least one of the possible rational
expectations equilibria of the model. When the equilibrium is unique, it must therefore have
this property if Rj  1.
Corollary 9. If Rj  1 for j 2 fD;Fg then, other things equal, an increase in attention by
dealers in security j reduces the illiquidity of this security ((@f=@D) < 0 and (@g=@F) < 0).
20Furthermore, there is always an equilibrium in which an increase in attention by dealers in
security j reduces the illiquidity of both securities in equilibrium.
To save space, we provide the proof of this result in the Internet Appendix. We illustrate
this corollary with a numerical example. We set  = 0:77, uj = 1, j = 1 and d = 1, so that
learning is two-sided. In Figure 6, we plot the relationship between the illiquidity of security D
and the fraction of pricewatchers in this security for D 2 f0:001;0:002;:::;1g when F = 0:5
(panel (a)) and F = 0:9 (panel (b)) when BF is xed at its equilibrium value for D = 0:001
(bold curve) and when BF adjusts to its equilibrium value for each value of D (dotted curve).
Thus, the bold curve represents the direct eect of a change in the fraction of pricewatchers
in security D (i.e., the eect holding constant the liquidity of security F) while the dotted
curve represents the evolution of the equilibrium value of the illiquidity of security D, after
accounting for spillover eects. The dierence between the two curves shows the amount by
which spillover eects magnify the direct eect of a change in attention on illiquidity.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Table 3 provides a summary of our main results when the level of attention in each market
is exogenous.
Panel A { One-sided learning d = 0
Attention Risk bearing capacity Spillovers from from D to F " F on BD " F on BF
No No spillovers No eect No eect
Limited
RF  1 + No Eect  
RF > 1 + i F  b F No Eect   i F  
F
F
Full + N.A. N.A.
Panel B { Two-sided learning d > 0
Attention Risk bearing capacity Spillovers from from j to  j " j on Bj " j on B j
No No spillovers No eect No eect
Limited
Rj  1 +    
Rj > 1 Ambiguous/can be negative Ambiguous Ambiguous
Full + N.A. N.A.
Table 3: Summary of the main ndings with exogenous attention.
4 Endogenous attention
We now endogenize the level of dealers' attention to the prices of other securities, i.e., j. To
this end we introduce a cost of attention, C (see the introduction of the paper for interpretations
21of this cost).21 We assume that dealers simultaneously make their decision to be a pricewatcher
at date 0, before trades take place at date 1. Dealers who become pricewatchers pay the cost
C. Other dealers do not pay this cost and cannot make their strategy contingent on the price
in the other market. Once these decisions have been made, trades take place as described in
the previous section.
Dealers' decisions to be a pricewatcher hinges on a comparison between the cost of attention
and the value of attention, i.e., the informational value of the price of the other security. Let
j be the value of the information contained in the price of security  j for dealers in security
j when a fraction j of dealers in security j are informed about the price of security  j. This
value is the maximum fee that a dealer in security j is willing to pay in order to observe the


















In general, the solution to this equation depends on the level of illiquidity in security  j since
this level determines the informational content of the price of security  j. We stress this feature
by explicitly writing j as a function of the illiquidity of security  j: j = j(j;B j). In
making their monitoring decisions, dealers take the fraction of pricewatchers as given. Hence,
for a given fraction of pricewatchers in each market, a dealer in security j chooses to monitor the
price of security  j if j(j;B j) > C and abstains from monitoring this price if j(j;B j) <
C. When j(j;B j) = C, the dealer is indierent between monitoring the price of security
 j or not.
The fraction of pricewatchers in each market results from this cost-benet analysis and
is ultimately determined by the cost of attention. In the rest of this section, we study the
eect of varying the cost of attention on the equilibrium fraction of pricewatchers and market
illiquidity. This analysis yields two new insights. First, a decrease in the cost of attention can
impair market liquidity. Second, when learning is two-sided, the value of attention for dealers
in one security can increase both in the level of attention by dealers in the same security and
dealers in the other security. As a consequence, dealers' attention decisions reinforce each other
and multiple equilibria with diering levels of attention can arise for the same level of the cost
of attention.
4.1 Attention decisions with one-sided learning
When d = 0, learning is one-sided: dealers in security D learn no information from the price of
security F. In this case, monitoring the price of security F for dealers in security D is worthless
(D(D;BF) = 0) and as a result all dealers in security D optimally abstain from paying the
cost of attention, i.e., D = 0. Thus, the level of illiquidity in security D is as given in the
21In our analysis we take the cost of attention as being exogenous. In reality, part of this cost is determined
by pricing decisions of data vendors (Bloomberg, Reuters, exchanges, etc...). An interesting extension of our
paper would be to endogenize this cost by studying the optimal pricing policy of sellers of price information
in our set-up. Cespa and Foucault (2009) study the optimal pricing policy for a monopolist seller of price
information. But they restrict their attention to the case with a single security.
22benchmark case, i.e., BD = 2
=D for all possible values of F. Hence, in this section we write
F(F;BD) as F(F) to simplify notation.
Using the specication of dealers' utility functions and the fact that all variables have a










As explained in Section 3.3, pricewatchers in security F obtain a signal !D about factor D from
monitoring the price of security D. The price information privately observed by pricewatchers
leaks partially through the price of security F as pricewatchers trade on this information, which
conveys a signal ^ !F to inattentive dealers. However, this signal is less informative than the
signal obtained by pricewatchers since price movements in security F are also aected by the
demand shock in this security. For this reason, pricewatchers can form a more precise forecast
of the payo of security F than inattentive dealers, that is Var[vFjF; ^ !F] > Var[vFjF;!D] and
the value of being a pricewatcher is always strictly positive. Intuitively, the value of monitoring
the price of security D for dealers in security F decreases in the fraction of pricewatchers in
security F because the leakage eect is stronger when the fraction of pricewatchers in security
F is higher. We establish this result in the next corollary.





















with BD = 2
=D. Thus, the value of monitoring the price of security D for dealers in security
F decreases in the fraction of pricewatchers in security F.
Hence, with one sided learning, the value of acquiring price information declines with the
fraction of dealers buying this information, as usual in models of information acquisition (e.g.,
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Admati and Peiderer (1986)). Let 
F(C) be the fraction of
dealers in security F who decide to pay the cost of attention. As F(F) decreases in F, there
are three possible cases:
1. If F(1) > C, then the value of monitoring the price of security D for dealers in security
F exceeds the cost of monitoring even when all dealers pay the cost of monitoring. Thus,

F(C) = 1.
2. If F(0) < C, then the value of monitoring the price of security D for dealers in security
F is always lower than the cost of monitoring. Thus, 
F(C) = 0.
3. Otherwise, the equilibrium fraction of pricewatchers is such that dealers in security F are
just indierent between monitoring the price of security D or not. That is, 
F(C) is the
unique solution of F(F) = C.
22Our expression for the value of information is standard in models of information acquisition with normally
distributed variables and CARA utility functions (see for instance Admati and Peiderer (1986)). Thus, for
brevity we omit the derivation of this result, which can be obtained upon request.
23We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. With one sided learning (d = 0), the fraction 
F(C) of dealers in security
F who monitor the price of security D in equilibrium decreases in the cost of attention. This
fraction is:
1. 













uD)(e2C=F  1) , if C  C  C:
3. 
F(C) = 1, if C < C,
where closed-form solutions for the thresholds C and C are given in the proof of the propo-
sition and BD = 2
=D.
The illiquidity of security F is in part determined by the fraction of pricewatchers in this
security (see Section 3.3). As this fraction is itself determined by the cost of attention, the
illiquidity of security F is ultimately determined by the cost of attention. The next corollary
describes the eect of a change in the cost of attention on the illiquidity of security F.
Corollary 10. With one sided learning (d = 0):
1. If RF  1 then the illiquidity of security F increases in the cost of attention for dealers
active in this security.
2. If RF > 1 , there exists a value of C 2 (C;C) such that the illiquidity of security F
increases in the cost of attention for dealers active in this security when C  C and
decreases in the cost of attention otherwise (the closed-form solution for C is given in
the proof of the corollary).
A decrease in the cost of attention leads to an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers
in security F when learning is one-sided. As explained in Section 3.3, this evolution has an
ambiguous eect on the illiquidity of security F. On the one hand, more attention reduces the
uncertainty on the payo of security F. On the other hand, inattentive dealers are more exposed
to adverse selection if the attention of their competitors increases. As shown in Corollary 6,
the uncertainty eect always dominates when RF  1. Thus, in this case, a reduction in
the cost of monitoring for dealers in security F always improves the liquidity of this security.
When RF > 1, the adverse selection eect dominates as long as the fraction of pricewatchers
remains small, i.e., when C is greater than C. Indeed, for this range of values for the cost of
attention, only a few dealers choose to be pricewatchers. As a result, a small decline in the cost
of attention reinforces the adverse selection risk for inattentive dealers and market liquidity
deteriorates. Figure 7 illustrates the impact that a change in the cost of attention has on the
fraction of pricewatchers, illiquidity, and the value of information with one-sided learning.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
244.2 Attention decisions with two sided learning
We now consider the case in which d > 0, so that dealers in each security can learn information
from the price of the other security. In this case, our main nding is that the value of price
information for dealers in a given market can be increasing in the fraction of pricewatchers in
both markets. This nding is counterintuitive since usually the value of nancial information
declines with the fraction of investors acquiring this information (see Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) or Admati and Peiderer (1986)). The value of price information has this property when
learning is one-sided, as we have just shown in Proposition 4. In contrast, when learning is
two-sided, price information is special: its value can increase in the number of investors who
buy this information. As we shall see the main reason for this counter-intuitive result is that the
value of price information tends to be higher for securities that are more liquid and securities
tend to be more liquid when the fraction of pricewatchers is large enough.
Using again the dealers' utility functions specication and the fact that all variables are
normally distributed, we obtain that the value of monitoring the price of security  j for dealers










where we stress the fact that the illiquidity of each market in equilibrium is a function of the
fraction of pricewatchers in either market. To save space we provide the explicit expression for









with Lj  (@j=@j) and j  (@j=@B j)(@B j=@j). Thus, the total eect of an increase in
the fraction of pricewatchers in security j on the value of being a pricewatcher is the sum of two
eects: the leakage eect (that we described in the previous section) and the feedback eect,
which is new as it arises only when learning is two-sided. To understand this feedback eect,
consider an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in security D (the reasoning is symmetric
for an increase in F). When d > 0, this increase aects the liquidity of security D and thereby
the liquidity of security F. In turn, the change in the liquidity of security F feeds back on the
value of monitoring this security since, as explained before, it aects the informativeness of the
price of security F for dealers in security D if d > 0. The change in the value of information
due to this feedback eect is measured by D. It is zero when learning is one-sided because
in this case dealers in security D learn no information from the price of security F (hence
@D=@BF = 0).23
The total eect of an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in security j on the value of
information in this market is positive if and only if the feedback eect outweighs the leakage
eect
j >  Lj > 0: (33)
23Moreover, @BD=@F = 0 when d = 0 since the illiquidity of security D is independent of F in this case
(BD = (2
=D)). Thus, F = 0 as well when learning is one-sided.
25If the feedback eect dominates (i.e., condition (33) holds true), the value of being a price-
watcher in security j increases in the fraction of pricewatchers in this security. Obviously, a
necessary condition for this to happen is that the feedback eect is positive, which is a possibil-
ity when Rj  1. To see this, consider again the value of monitoring security F for dealers in
security D. When RD  1, as shown in Corollary 9, an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers
in security D reduces the illiquidity of security F (@BF=@D < 0). As a consequence, the price
of security F becomes more informative for dealers in security D and the value of monitoring
this price is higher (@D=@BF < 0), at least for some parameter values. In this case, the
feedback eect for security D is positive: D > 0.
We have not been able to delineate the set of parameters under which the feedback eect
dominates the leakage eect. However, numerical simulations show that this set is not empty.
To see this, consider Figure 8. Panel (a) on this gure plots the value of monitoring security F
for pricewatchers in security D (i.e., D(D;BF)) for two values of F. In both cases the value
of observing the price of security F increases with the fraction of pricewatchers in security D,
which means that the feedback eect dominates the leakage eect.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
Now consider the eect of a change in the fraction of pricewatchers located in market  j on












As shown in Corollary 9, an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in, say, security D reduces
the illiquidity of this security ((@BD=@D) < 0) if RD  1. In turn this eect makes the price
of security D more informative for dealers in security F and increases the value of monitoring
this price for dealers in security F ((@F=@BD) < 0). In this case, (dF=dD) > 0. That is, an
increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in security D makes the value of monitoring the price
of security D higher for dealers in security F.
Figure 8 illustrates the cross-market monitoring eect as well. First, consider panel (a)
again. It shows that the value of monitoring the price of security F for dealers in security D
is higher, all else being equal when F = 0:9 than when F = 0:1. Moreover, panel (b) shows
that an increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in security D makes the value of monitoring
security D higher for dealers in security F.
Thus, price information is special because the decision of each dealer to buy this information
can reinforce each other both in the same market and across dierent markets.24 The model
shows that this happens in two distinct ways: (i) the value of being informed about the price of
another security can increase in the fraction of dealers who follow this security (\within market
24The leakage eect implies that dealers' decisions to buy price information are \strategic substitutes": the
acquisition of price information by one dealer reduces the value of being a pricewatcher for other dealers. In
contrast, when positive, the feedback eect works to make dealers' decisions to buy price information \strategic
complements": the acquisition of price information by one dealer strengthens the value of being a pricewatcher
for other dealers operating in the same market.
26complementarity") and (ii) the value of being informed about the price of another security
can increase in the fraction of pricewatchers in this security (\cross market complementarity").
Both types of complementarity in dealers' monitoring decisions are absent when d = 0 and they
do not necessarily both operate when d > 0 (in particular the leakage eect may prevail over
the feedback eect even though the cross-market complementarity operates).
Now consider whether a dealer in market j should become a pricewatcher. In making
this decision, the dealer takes the fraction of pricewatchers in both markets as given. If
j(j;B j(D;F)) > C, it is optimal for the dealer to be a pricewatcher since the value
of monitoring the price in the other market is higher than the cost. If j(j;B j(D;F)) <
C, it is optimal for the dealer not to monitor the price in the other market and nally, if
j(j;B j(D;F)) = C, the dealer is just indierent. Given these observations, the equilib-
rium fractions of pricewatchers in each market, (
D;






 j = 1 j(1;B j(1;1)) > C for j 2 fD;Fg
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j = 1, 
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 j 2 (0;1) 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 j 2 (0;1) 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 j = 0 j(0;B j(0;0)) < C for j 2 fD;Fg.
Table 4: The equilibrium fraction of pricewatchers in markets j and  j.
Complementarities in attention decisions among dealers located in dierent markets lead
to multiple equilibria for the levels of attention. Indeed, these complementarities imply that
the value of cross-market monitoring will be relatively high when the fraction of pricewatchers
in both markets is high and relatively low when the fraction of pricewatchers in both markets
is low. Thus, for intermediate values of the cost of monitoring, there is room for multiple
equilibria with various levels of market integration for the same values of the parameters (in
particular the correlation of the payos of the two securities being xed).
It is worth stressing that the multiplicity of possible attention levels in equilibrium is a
phenomenon distinct from the multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria. Indeed, one may
have a single linear rational expectations equilibrium for each possible level of attention in each
security and yet multiple equilibrium levels of attention. As an example, consider the parameter
values of Figure 8 again and suppose C = 0:06. For the parameter values in Figure 8, there
is a unique non-fully rational expectations equilibrium for each value of D and F. However,
there are three possible pairs of equilibrium values for the levels of attention in each market: (i)

D = 
F = 1, (ii) 
D = 0, 
F = 1 and (iii) 
D ' 0:3, 
F = 1. In all these equilibria, all dealers
in security F pay attention to the price of security D. In contrast, for the same parameter
values, we can have an equilibrium in which dealers in security D do not follow security F
27(
D = 0), an equilibrium in which all dealers in security D follow security F (
D = 1) or an
equilibrium in which only a fraction of dealers in security D buy price information on security
F (
D ' 0:3). Thus, for the same fundamentals, dealers in security D can appear to neglect
the information contained in the price of security F or to be very sensitive to this information.
We may also have situations in which, for the same parameter values, the markets for the two
securities appear fully segmented because dealers in either market pay no attention to the other
market (
D = 
F = 0) or fully integrated because all dealers are pricewatchers (
D = 
F = 1).
To see this, consider the case in which the two markets are perfectly symmetric: F = D = ,



















In this symmetric case, there are two non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibria if
D = F = 1 (see Section 3.2). For the discussion, we focus on the high illiquidity equilibrium
in which the level of illiquidity in markets D and F is BH (given in equation (10)). In the
symmetric case, parameters are identical in the two markets. Hence, by symmetry, we have
F(1;BH) = D(1;BH) and F(0;BF0) = D(0;BD0). That is, the value of price information
is identical in each market in the full attention case and in the no attention case, respectively.
Let 0 be the value of price information in the no attention case and let 1 be the value of price
information in the full attention case. Using equation (35), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. In the symmetric case (i.e., F = D = , d = 1,  = 0 and uF = uD = u):
1. The value of monitoring prices in market  j for dealers in market j is strictly higher
when D = F = 1 than when D = F = 0, that is, 1 > 0 for j 2 fH;Lg:
2. Moreover if the cost of attention is such that 0 < C < 1, then the cases in which all
dealers are pricewatchers (
D = 




The rst part of the proposition shows that in the symmetric case the value of monitoring
is always higher when all dealers are pricewatchers than when no dealers are pricewatchers.
For this reason, for the same parameters value, the markets for securities F and D can be
either fully integrated (all dealers in each market account for the price information available in
the other market) or fully segmented, as claimed in the second part of the proposition. As an
























Thus, for any value of C 2 [0:055;0:127], the markets for securities F and D can be either fully
segmented or fully integrated, depending on whether dealers in both markets coordinate on the
high or the low attention equilibrium. The liquidity of both markets and the informativeness
of prices are higher if dealers coordinate on the high attention equilibrium. Interestingly, in
28this case, the markets can remain segmented even if the cost of attention decreases, unless it
falls below C = 0:055.
In summary, when learning is two sided, the value of price information can increase in the
fraction of pricewatchers. This property means that dealers' decisions to monitor the price of
another security are complements both within and across markets. That is, they reinforce each
other. As a consequence, multiple equilibria with diering levels of attention are sustainable
and two securities may appear segmented even though the correlation of their payos is high
and the cost of monitoring is relatively low.
This result has interesting implications. First, it implies that fads, traditions, or other coor-
dination devices may determine the degree of integration between two securities, independently
of the correlation in the payos of these securities. Second, a decrease in the cost of attention
(due for instance to better information linkages between markets) does not necessarily entail
greater market integration, unless the cost is very low. Third, dealers operating in related
but opaque segments may undervalue the benet of greater market integration. Indeed, in the
low attention equilibrium, the value of getting price information is low. Thus, data vendors
will perceive a weak demand and will therefore lack incentives to collect and disseminate price
information. In this case, regulatory intervention is needed. A case in point is the U.S. corpo-
rate bond market where real time dissemination of bond prices took o only under regulatory
pressure (see Bessembinder et al. (2006)).
5 Testable implications
One way to test whether cross-security learning is a source of liquidity spillovers is to consider
changes in trading technologies that aect dealers' ability to learn from the prices of other
securities. According to our model, these changes should aect the extent of liquidity spillovers
across securities and the levels of liquidity for these securities. In contrast, theories of liquidity
co-movements based on market wide changes in dealers' risk bearing capacity (e.g., Brunner-
meier and Pedersen (2009)) make no predictions on such changes in trading technologies. In
the rest of the paper, we illustrate this approach with two thought experiments.
5.1 From opaque to transparent markets
Suppose that the markets for securities D and F are opaque so that the cost of obtaining
information on the prices of securities D and F is high. In this case, the fraction of pricewatchers
in both securities is low. Let us denote the fraction of pricewatchers in this environment by
b
j for j 2 fD;Fg. Now suppose that the market for security D becomes transparent while
the market for security F remains opaque. After this switch, the fraction of pricewatchers in
security D remains unchanged whereas the fraction of pricewatchers in security F is higher






j is the fraction of pricewatchers in security j after the
switch to a new trading system for security F. To simplify the discussion, let us assume that
29b
D = a
D = 0. In this case the model has a unique rational expectations equilibrium for all
values of F and we can use Corollaries 6 and 8 to develop predictions about the eects of this
change in market design.
In this case, if dealers' risk bearing capacity in security F is relatively low (RF  1), the
liquidity of security F should increase after the market for security D becomes transparent (see
Corollary 8), even though the market structure for security F is identical before and after the
change aecting the other security. Moreover, co-variation in liquidity between securities D
and F should be positive and greater than before the change in market design as explained in
Section 3.3 (Corollary 6).
If instead, dealers' risk bearing capacity in security F is relatively large (RF > 1) and the
fraction of pricewatchers in security F remains small (a
F < 
F
F ) then the liquidity of security F
should decrease after the market for security D becomes transparent (Corollary 8). The reason
is that the transparency of security D exposes inattentive dealers active in security F to adverse
selection by giving an informational advantage to pricewatchers (see Section 3.3.3). Moreover,
in this case, liquidity spillovers from security D to security F will be negative (Corollary 6).
The implementation of the TRACE system in the U.S. corporate bond market is a eld
experiment close to the thought experiment we just described. Until 2002, the U.S. corporate
bond market was very opaque: the price of each transaction was known only to the parties
involved in the transaction. This situation changed when the SEC required dissemination
of transaction prices for a subset of bonds through a reporting system called TRACE. This
requirement initially applied to 498 bonds and was implemented in July 2002. Bessembinder et
al. (2006) study the eects of this reform of the bond market on the liquidity of TRACE eligible
bonds (security D in our thought experiment) and non-TRACE-eligible bonds (security F).25
Interestingly, Bessembinder et al. (2006) nd a signicant increase in liquidity for non-TRACE
eligible bonds, as predicted by our model (see Table 3, page 272 in Bessembinder et al.(2006)).
The model makes the additional prediction, which to our knowledge has yet to be tested, that
the liquidity of non-TRACE bonds should become more sensitive to changes in the liquidity of
TRACE bonds after the implementation of TRACE. This prediction can be tested by analyzing
the lead-lag relationships between measures of liquidity for TRACE-eligible bonds and non-
TRACE bonds. The model implies that a shock to the liquidity of TRACE bonds should have
a greater eect in absolute value on the liquidity of non-TRACE bonds after the implementation
of TRACE and that the direction of this eect might be negative if few dealers in non-TRACE
bonds watch the prices of TRACE bonds.
Bessembinder et al.(2010) also nds that the liquidity of the TRACE eligible bonds increases.
This nding is consistent with the model as well. To see this suppose now that both the markets
for securities D and F become transparent. If Rj  1 for both securities or j is high enough
then the liquidity of both securities is higher in the transparent system, for all values of the
fraction of pricewatchers (see Corollary 9).
25Edward et al. (2005) and Goldstein et al. (2007) also consider the eects of greater transparency in the
U.S. bond markets. However, they do not analyze the eects of greater transparency on non-eligible bonds.
305.2 Co-location fees
The recent years have witnessed a growth of so called \high frequency market-makers" (e.g.,
GETCO, Optiver, etc...), who use highly automated strategies. These market-makers often
use price information available about one security to take positions in other securities. For
instance, they monitor quote updates in stock index futures and use this information to set
their quotes in other securities.
The case in which d = 0 can be used to analyze this type of trading strategy. Indeed, in this
case we can interpret security D as providing information on a market wide risk factor (D)
and security F as a security that loads on this factor and another factor (F). We interpret
pricewatchers in security F as high frequency market-makers: they watch in real-time the price
of security D and use this information to determine their position in security F.
As explained in the introduction, high frequency market-makers obtain price information
faster than other market participants by co-locating their computers close to trading platforms'
matching engines, at a cost equal to the co-location fee charged by the platform.26 Thus, the
co-location fee is one component of the cost of price information.
Now suppose that the co-location fee declines. In this case, Proposition 4 implies that the
number of high frequency market-makers should increase since the cost of price information
declines. If the risk bearing capacity of high-frequency market-makers is low (RF  1), entry
of new pricewatchers should improve the liquidity of security F. Moreover, liquidity spillovers
from security D to security F should be positive and stronger after the reduction in the co-
location fee (see Corollary 10 and Figure 5).
If instead the risk bearing capacity of high-frequency market-makers is high (RF > 1), the
scenario is more complex. If C > C, entry of new high frequency market-makers increases the
exposure to adverse selection for other dealers in security F. Thus, the liquidity of security F
should drop after the reduction in the co-location fee (see Corollary 10). Moreover, liquidity
spillovers from security D to security F can be negative in this case. Indeed, an improvement in
liquidity for security D allows pricewatchers in security F to obtain more precise information.
Thus, if the fraction of pricewatchers remains small, the risk of adverse selection for inattentive
dealers increases and the liquidity of security F drops following an increase in liquidity for
security D.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) study entry of a high frequency market-maker in Dutch
stocks traded on Chi-X (a European trading platform). They show empirically that following
this entry, quotes in Chi-X become relatively more informative on price innovations in the Dutch
index futures.27 Moreover, the liquidity of the stocks in which the high frequency market-maker
is active improves. This is consistent with the model when RF  1. In this case the model
makes the additional prediction that the liquidity of Dutch shares should become more sensitive
26This fee can be signicant. For instance, the monthly fee for this service for stocks listed on NYSE Amex
is as high as $61,000 per month in 2011. See NYSE Amex equities price list 2011 at http://www.nyse.com/
pdfs/amex-equities-prices.pdf.
27Hendershott and Riordan (2010) also nd empirically that high frequency traders make the market more
informationally ecient.
31to changes in the liquidity of the Dutch index futures after entry of the high-frequency market-
maker.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a new mechanism that explains the transmission of liquidity shocks
in one market to another market (\liquidity spillovers"). Central to this mechanism is the fact
that dealers in one security often use the price of other securities as a source of information
to set their quotes. The price of a security conveys a noisier signal about fundamentals when
the market for this security is less liquid. As a result, a drop in the liquidity of one security
propagates to other securities because it increases the level of uncertainty for dealers in all
other securities. This propagation of the initial liquidity shock makes all prices less informative,
which amplies the initial drop in liquidity. For this reason, even small initial shocks on market
liquidity in one asset class can ultimately result in large market wide changes in liquidity.28
The model provides several additional insights:
1. Liquidity spillovers are not necessarily positive. The direction of these spillovers depends
on the fraction of dealers with price information on other securities. When this fraction
is large, liquidity spillovers are positive. In contrast, liquidity spillovers can be negative
when price information is only available to a relatively small number of dealers and dealers'
risk bearing capacity is large.
2. A decrease in the cost of price information can increase market illiquidity if it triggers
too small an increase in the fraction of dealers who acquire information on the price of
other securities.
3. The value of price information can increase, for some parameter values, with the fraction of
dealers buying this information. For this reason, for the same parameter values, multiple
levels of segmentation (high, medium or low) between securities can be sustained in
equilibrium.
Future work should study the implications of our model for asset pricing. The model implies
that the extent of liquidity co-movements between assets is in part determined by the cost of
acquiring price information. Hence, liquidity risk and therefore risk premia should be sensitive
to changes in trading technologies that aect this cost, as explained in the last part of our
paper. Moreover the model implies that the liquidity of some securities could covary negatively
28In line with this transmission mechanism, the CFTC-SEC report on the Flash crash emphasizes the role that
uncertainty on the cause (transient price pressures or changes in fundamentals) of the large price movements in
the E-mini futures on the S&P500 played in the evaporation of liquidity during the Flash crash. The authors of
this report write (on page 39): \market makers that track the prices of securities that are underlying components
of an ETF are more likely to pause their trading if there are price-driven or data-driven integrity questions about
those prices. Moreover extreme volatility in component stocks makes it very dicult to accurately value an ETF
in real-time. When this happens, market participants who would otherwise provide liquidity for such ETFs may
widen their quotes or stop providing liquidity [...]." This is consistent with our model in which the liquidity of
a security drops when prices of other securities become less reliable as a source of information.
32with the liquidity of other securities. These securities should therefore provide a good hedge
against market wide variations in liquidity and oer negative risk premia for this risk. Do such
securities exist in reality? Do they have the characteristics that our model predicts (relatively
few well informed dealers with high risk bearing capacity)? We leave these questions for future
research.
33A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If D = 0 then all dealers in security D only observe factor D when they choose their demand
function. As dealers have a CARA utility function, it is immediate that their demand function









 + d2 : (A.1)
Using the clearing condition, we deduce that the clearing price is such that:






uD = D + BD0uD:
A similar reasoning yields the expression of the clearing price for security F. 2
Proof of Proposition 1
This proposition is a special case of Proposition 2, which considers the more general case in
which j can take any value. This proposition is proved below. 2
Proof of Lemma 2
In the symmetric case, we can proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2 to show that a non-fully
revealing linear rational expectations equilibrium exists if and only if the system of equations
(8) and (9) has at least one strictly positive solution. Solving this sytem shows that this is
the case if and only if 2
u  42 and that in this case the system of equations (8) and (9) has
two solutions: B
D = B
F = BH and B
D = B
F = BL. Otherwise, the unique solution of
this system is B
D1 = 0 and BF1 = 0. Hence, there is no non-fully revealing linear rational
expectations equilibria when 2
u < 42. 2
Proof of Lemma 3
See Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 2. 2
Proof of Corollary 1
From Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 2, we deduce that when D = F = 1, there is a unique
non-fully revealing equilibrium if and only if 	0
1(BD1) < 0, 8BD1. Using the expression for









































Remember that when D = F = 1, BD1 > 2
=D (see Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 2).




Proof of Corollary 2
The result follows immediately from equation (17) 2
34Proof of Corollary 3
The result follows immediately from equations (15) and (16). 2
Proof of Corollary 4
The result follows immediately from the denition of functions f1() and g1() in Proposition 1.
2
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. We show below (Step 2) that if p
j = Rjj + Bjuj + Aj j + Cju j is a rational
expectations equilibrium then Rj = 1 and Cj = AjB j. Hence, in a rational expectations
equilibrium, the price in market j can be written p
j = !j + Aj! j, where !j = j + Bjuj.
Thus, fj, ! jg is a sucient statistic for fj;p j;pjg. Clearly, the equilibrium is non-fully
revealing if and only if Bj > 0. Moreover, fj; ^ !jg is a sucient statistic for fj;pjg, where
^ !j = Bjuj + Aj! j and since ! j = p




j = !j + Aj(p

 j   A j!j) = (1   AjA j)!j + Ajp

 j:
These observations prove Lemma 3.
Step 2. Equilibrium in market j.




























j (E[vjjj;p j;pj]   pj); (A.2)
with aW
j = jVar[vjjj;p j] 1.
As fD, !Fg is a sucient statistic for fD;pF;pDg, we deduce (using well-known properties








































D (D;!F) = a
W





















Similarly, for pricewatchers in security F we obtain
x
W
F (F;!D) = a
W
F (F   pF) + b
W
F !D; (A.8)



























F  (1 + B2
D2
uD) 1.




























j(E[vjjj;pj]   pj); (A.10)
with aI
j = jVar[vjjj;p j] 1.
As fD; ^ !Dg is a sucient statistic for fD;pDg, we deduce (using well-known properties of
normal random variables) that








































D(D; ^ !D) = a
I






















Similarly, for market F we obtain:
x
I
F(F; ^ !F) = a
I
F(F   pF) + b
I






























Clearing price in market j. The clearing condition in market j 2 fD;Fg imposes
jx
W
j (j;pj;p j) + (1   j)x
I
j(j;pj) + uj = 0:
Let aj = jaW
j + (1   j)aI




j = j +
 
bW











Remember that we are searching for an equilibrium such that p
j = Rjj+Bjuj+Aj j+Cju j.


















aj   (1   j)bI
j
; for j 2 fD;Fg; (A.18)
Aj = jBjb
W
j ; for j 2 fD;Fg: (A.19)
Coecients Aj and Cj ultimately depend on the coecients fBj, B jg. Hence, the equilibrium
is fully characterized once coecients Bj and B j are known as claimed in the proposition.













































































































































 + d2)(1 + B2
F2
uF)) and BD0 = (2


























F = (1 + B2
D2
uD) 1 and BF0 = 
 1
F . Last, as Var[vDjD] = 2
 + d2 and Var[vFjF] = 1,
we obtain that
















as claimed in the proposition.








When D = F = 1, we deduce from equations (A.25) and (A.27) that a non-fully rational




































38Substituting the expression for BF1 in equation (A.30), we deduce that the equilibrium levels
for the illiquidity of security BD1 solve 	1(BD1) = 0. Thus, a non-fully revealing equilibrium














































Thus, (A.32) has at least one solution B
D1 in the interval [2
=D;(2
 + d2)=D]. As 2
 > 0,
this proves existence of a non-fully revealing equilibrium when D = F = 1.
Step 4. Existence of a non fully revealing equilibrium with limited attention (j <
1).
With limited attention, we deduce from equations (A.25) and (A.27) that a non-fully revealing







uF)   BD = 0:
























Thus, there always exists a strictly positive value B
D, such that 	(B
D) = 0 when 2
 > 0. 2
Proof of Corollary 5






































with  = 1   ((@g1=@BD1)(@f1=@BF1)):
39Step 2: Now we prove that there alwauys exists at least one non fully revealing rational


















1(BD1) < 1 at an equilibrium value for BD1 then there exists at least one equilibrium
in which  > 1. Remember that the equilibrium values for BD1 solve (see Step 3 in the proof
of Proposition 2)
	1(BD1)  h1(BD1)   BD1 = 0.
Hence, the roots of the polynomial 	1(BD1) are the possible equilibrium values for the illiquidity










































Using Descartes' rule of signs, we obtain that 	1() has ve, three or one positive root. These
roots correspond to the intersections of the function h1(BD1) with the 45-degree line. As
h1(0) = 2


















the function h1(BD1) cuts for the rst time the 45-degree line from above. Hence, at this
intersection point, we must have h0
1(BD1) < 1. Let BL
D1 be this intersection point. When
the equilibrium is unique, the equilibrium level of illiquidity must be BL
D1 as otherwise h1()
would never cut the 45-degree line and therefore an equilibrium would not exist. When there
are multiple equilibria, BL
D1 is the lowest level of illiquidity for security D among all non-fully
revealing equilibria since this is the lowest positive root of 	1(BD1). Thus, there always exists
an equilibrium in which h0
1(BD1) < 1 at the equilibrium value for BD1.
2
Proof of Corollary 6
Step 1: For the expressions for the illiquidity levels in securities D and F, see the paragraph
that precedes the corollary.

























The numerator of this expression contains a quadratic polynomial in F with two real roots.





















As the leading coecient on P(F) (i.e., the coecient on 4
F) is positive, we deduce that
(@BF=@BD) is positive if and only if F > ^ F. Direct calculations show that ^ F  0, if
RF  1. Thus, in this case, (@BF=@BD) is positive for all values of F. Otherwise ^ F > 0
and (@BF=@BD) < 0 if and only if F < ^ F. This implies that ^ F < 1, as otherwise liquidity
spillovers would be negative even when F = 1 (which we know is impossible from Corollary
4). 2
Proof of Corollary 7
First observe that a change in B j only aects the illiquidity of security j through its eect on
2
j. As 2
j decline in B j, we deduce that liquidity spillovers from security j to security  j are
positive if and only if (@Bj=@2
j) < 0. Now we show that j  j is a sucient condition for





















































D(1   D)))2 > 0:
Inserting this expression and the expression for G(D;2

































D < 1, we deduce that the sign of (@BD=@2












which is positive if D  D. We deduce that (@f=@BF) > 0 if D > D. A similar reasoning
shows that (@g=@BD) > 0 if F > F. 2
41Proof of Corollary 8




























The sign of this derivative is the same as the sign of its numerator, which is a quadratic
polynomial in F with a positive leading coecient. Hence, its sign is positive for all values
of F that are larger, in absolute value, than the two real roots of this polynomial. Upon






















We observe that 
F
F  0 if and only if RF  1. Thus, in this case, (@BF=@F) < 0, as claimed
in Part 1 of the corollary. When RF > 1, we have 
F
F > 0 and (@BF=@F) > 0 if and only
if F < 
F
F , as claimed in the second part of the corollary. Last we observe that 
F
F < 1
as otherwise the illiquidity of security F would be smaller with full attention than with no
attention, which is never true (see Corollary 4). 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Using the notations introduced in the proof of Proposition 2, we have






















































and the expression for F(F;BD) given in the corollary follows. It is then immediate that
@F(F)=@F < 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
As explained in the text, the fraction of pricewatchers in equilibrium is zero i F(0) < C.













Similarly, the fraction of pricewatchers in equilibrium is one i F(1) > C. Using equation




















42Otherwise the fraction of pricewatchers in equilibrium solves F(F;BD) = C and we obtain
the expression for 
F(C) by inverting F(F) given in equation (30). 2
Proof of Corollary 10
For a given value of C, the level of illiquidity of security F is given by BF(
F(C)) where BF()
















We know that (@
F(C)=@C)  0 (Proposition 4). Moreover, using equation (26), we deduce


















uFVar[vFjF]; b F = 0 and (@BF=@F)jF=
F(C) < 0. It follows that
(@BF=@C) > 0. When 2
F > 2
uFVar[vFjF] then b F > 0. As 
F(C) decreases with C from
one to zero over [C, C], there exists a value C 2 (C, C) such 
F(C) = b F and 
F(C) < b F
i C > C. Thus, in this case, (@BF=@F) < 0 i C < C. The second part of the corollary
follows. 2


































































4 > 0: (A.39)
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5 > 0:
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4   ((4
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43Straighforward calculations show that this is the case when 2
u > 42, which is required for the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
Part 2: Suppose that 
D = 
F = 1. Then in this case, the value of monitoring market j for a
dealer in security  j, given the actions of other dealers, is 1. As this value is higher than C,
monitoring is optimal. Hence 
D = 
F = 1 is an equilibrium. Now suppose that 
D = 
F = 0.
Then in this case, the value of monitoring market j for a market-maker in market  j, given
the actions of other dealers, is 0. As this value is lower than C, not monitoring is optimal.
Hence 
D = 
F = 0 is an equilibrium. 2
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Figure 2: Equilibrium determination with full attention: multiplicity (panel (a)) and uniqueness
(panel (b) and (c)). Parameters' values are as follows: j = d = 1, uj = 2, and  = :2 (panel




































Figure 3: Illiquidity multiplier. In panel (a) we plot  as a function of . Panels (b) and (c)
show the direct eect (dotted line) and total eect (plain line) of a change in the risk tolerance
of the dealers in security D on the illiquidity of securities D and F, respectively as a function
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Figure 4: Negative liquidity spillovers. Parameters' values are as follows: uF = :1, uD = 1,












































Figure 5: Comovement in illiquidity. The gure displays the covariance between the illiquidity
of security F and the illiquidity of security D as a function of F when d = 0 (panel (a)) and
d = 0:9 (panels (b) and (c)). In panel (b) the covariance between the illiquidity of the two
securities is higher when D = 0:9 (light curve) than when D = 0:1 (bold curve), for all values
of F > 0. Other parameter values are uF = uD = 1=2,  = 2, F = 1=2, and D 2 f0:1;0:9g
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Figure 6: The gure displays the illiquidity of security D as a function of D when F = 0:5
(in panel (a)) and when F = 0:9 (panel (b)) when BF is xed at its equilibrium value for
D = 0:001 (bold curve) and when instead it adjusts to its equilibrium value for each value of
D (dotted curve). The dierence between the two curves shows the amount by which spillover
eects magnify the direct eect of a change in attention on illiquidity. Parameters' values are










































































Figure 7: Impact of a change in the cost of attention on the fraction of pricewatchers, illiquidity,
and the value of information with one-sided learning. Case with RF  1 (panels (a), (c), and
(e)), and case with RF > 1 (panels (b), (d), and (f)). Parameters' values are as follows:
uD = 1, F = D = 1, d = 0, and  = 1, with uF = 1 in panels (a), (c), and (e) whereas
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Figure 8: Positive feedback eect and cross-market monitoring eect. In panel (a) we plot
D as a function of D, for F 2 f0:1;0:9g. In panel (b) we plot F as a function of D, for
F 2 f0:1;0:9g. Other parameter values are as follows:  = 1, uF = uD = 1, F = D = 1,









Learning from Prices, Liquidity Spillovers, and 
Market Segmentation  
 
Giovanni Cespa 
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